En décembre 2007, Jacqueline Hamesse a fêté son 65ème anniversaire, puis a accédé à l’éméritat en 2008. Nombreux sont les collègues et amis qui ont souhaité marquer ces dates en rendant hommage à son dévouement aux études médiévales, que ce soit dans l’enseignement et la recherche ou pour la création et le développement d’institutions internationales dans ce domaine, sans oublier les efforts déployés pour l’édition de nombreux ouvrages collectifs et l’organisation de diverses rencontres scientifiques. Nous avons donc décidé de lui (...) dédier ce volume d’études intitulé «Florilegium mediaevale». L’ouvrage comprend des études concernant l’un des quatre thèmes suivants: les textes philosophiques dans leur contexte et leur support matériel, les instruments travail ainsi que le vocabulaire des textes philosophiques. En effet, ce sont des domaines qui ont surtout retenu son attention depuis de nombreuses années et dans lesquels elle a apporté des contributions significatives à la recherche. Contributions de: L-J. Bataillon (†) et O. Weijers (Paris / Den Haag), F. Bertelloni (Buenos Aires), Ch. Burnett (London), J. Casteigt (Toulouse), J. Celeyrette et J-L. Solère (Lille / Boston), W. Courtenay (Wisconsin-Madison), G. Dahan (Paris), G. Dinkova-Bruun (Toronto), K. Emery Jr. (Notre Dame), Ch. Erismann (Cambridge), B. Faes de Mottoni (Milano), G. Federici Vescovini (Firenze), B. Fernández de la Cuesta (Madrid), R. Friedman et Ch. Schabel (Leuven / Nicosia), D. Gottschall (Lecce), S. Harvey (Jerusalem), I. Heullant-Donat (Reims), R. Hissette (Köln), M. Hoenen (Freiburg i.B.), J. Meirinhos (Porto), O. Merisalo (Jyväskylä), M. Mulchahey (Toronto), M. J. Muñoz Jiménez (Madrid), M. C. Pacheco (Porto), G. Piaia (Padova), R. H. Pich (Porto Alegre), J. Puig Montada (Madrid), R. Ramón Guerrero (Madrid), C. Sirat et M. Geoffroy (Paris), G. Spinosa (Roma), I. Ventura (Louvain-la-Neuve). (shrink)

Voici une dition qui contribuera sans doute clairer une activit encore mal connue de Voltaire, celle d' diteur. Car de cette uvre composite qu'est le Discours de l'empereur Julien Voltaire se veut avant tout et reste bien l'organisateur, empruntant l'empereur du IVe si cle le r quisitoire qu'il a dress dans son Contre les Galil ens et au marquis d'Argens, son moderne et premier traducteur, la 'belle infid le' qu'il a donn e lire cinq ans plus t t ceux qui (...) n'entendaient ni le grec ni le latin. Voltaire n'a cependant conserv le joyau que pour le servir dans une monture toute nouvelle: d'Argens avait accompagn sa traduction d'une substantielle pr face et d'une annotation abondante; mais Voltaire a cart la premi re et retenu un tiers seulement de la seconde, encadrant d sormais le Discours de ses propres textes; en pr faces un 'Avis au lecteur' suivi d'un 'Portrait de l'empereur Julien' et d'un 'Examen du Discours'; en postface un virulent 'Suppl ment au Discours'. A quoi l'on ajoutera les quarante-quatre notes r dig es par l' diteur et qui s'adjoignent aux treize notes de d'Argens qu'il a conserv es; ce sont les 'nouvelles notes de divers auteurs' annonc s par la page de titre et dont quatre sont sign es Damilaville, Boulanger, Bolingbroke et 'le th ologien Th ro': sous ces noms d'emprunt, l' diteur ne s'est pas fait scrupule de r utiliser certains de ses textes ant rieurs, pas plus qu'il n'a craint, par de simples coupes habilement op r es dans certaines notes de d'Argens, de d figurer l'occasion la pens e du marquis quand elle se trouve contraire la sienne. Ainsi voit-on clairer sous ses diff rents aspects une activit ditoriale dont il fallait aussi p n trer les motifs. (shrink)

Paul Ricoeur realizó su primera incursión sobre la temática del mal en su primer periodo, conocido como filosofía de la voluntad, que comprende especialmente los libros "Lo voluntario y lo involuntario", "El hombre lábil" y "La simbólica del mal!. Este estudio pretende presentar las claves internas a partir de las cuales Ricoeur realiza su investigación, analizando los conceptos fundamentales sobre los que gira y su posterior desarrollo. También busca incidir en los presupuestos antropológicos de los que parte, para después realizar (...) análisis de las consecuencias éticas que tienen dichos presupuestos. En este sentido se ha prestado una especial atención a la vinculación existente de la investigación de Ricoeur con la teoría del conocimiento kantiana y con la filosofía hegeliana.. (shrink)

The persistent failure of public schooling in low-income communities constitutes one of our nation's most pressing civil rights and social justice issues. Many school reformers recognize that poverty, racism, and a lack of power held by these communities undermine children's education and development, but few know what to do about it. A Match on Dry Grass argues that community organizing represents a fresh and promising approach to school reform as part of a broader agenda to build power for low-income communities (...) and address the profound social inequalities that affect the education of children. Based on a comprehensive national study, the book presents rich and compelling case studies of prominent organizing efforts in Chicago, New York City, Los Angeles, Denver, San Jose, and the Mississippi Delta. The authors show how organizing groups build the participation and leadership of parents and students so they can become powerful actors in school improvement efforts. They also identify promising ways to overcome divisions and create the collaborations between educators and community residents required for deep and sustainable school reform. Identifying the key processes that create strong connections between schools and communities, Warren, Mapp, and their collaborators show how community organizing builds powerful relationships that lead to the transformational change necessary to advance educational equity and a robust democracy. (shrink)

The “power of the real”, which Zubiri conceptualized in the final period of his philosophy, is “inspired” in the creation concept of the Greek Fathers, according to Zubiri’sexposition of Greek Patristics in “Supernatural Being: God and Deification in Pauline Theology”. In addition, Zubiri makes that concept his own in a course on Christianity, published posthumously. That inspiration can be detected when Zubiri radicalizes his philosophical approach. This implies purifying his philosophy of elements from Latin theology,whose notions he contrasts with those (...) of Greek theology in the aforementioned work. InOn Essence, these elements do not permit Zubiri to elude the horizon of nihility, in hisview in force in Western thought from St. Augustine to Hegel, but not genuinely philosophical because it originates with Revelation. A consequence of this radicalization is toconside r “creation” as a revealed datum. At the same time, and insofar as this radicalization implies sticking only to the facts, Zubiri elaborates a proof of the reality of God, fromwhich follow as intellectually legitimate non-theistic options.El “poder de lo real”, que Zubiri conceptualiza en el último período de su filosofía, está “inspirado” en el concepto de creación propio de los Padres griegos, según la exposiciónque hace de la Patrística griega en “El ser sobrenatural: Dios y la deificación en la teologíapaulina”. Además, hace suyo ese concepto en un curso sobre el Cristianismo, publicadopóstumamente. Dicha inspiración puede detectarse cuando se radicalizan sus planteamientos filosóficos. Esto implicó depurar su filosofía de elementos provenientes de la Teología latina, cuyas nociones contrapone a los de la Teología griega en el trabajo mencionado. A la altura de Sobre la esencia, esos elementos no le permitirán sustraerse al horizontede nihilidad, a su juicio vigente en el pensamiento occidental desde San Agustín hastaHegel, y no genuinamente filosófico porque se origina con la Revelación. Consecuencia deesa radicalidad es considerar la “creación” como un dato revelado. Al mismo tiempo, y en lamedida en que esa radicalización implica atenerse sólo a los hechos, Zubiri elabora unaprueba de la realidad de Dios desde la que resultan intelectualmente legítimas las opciones no teístas. (shrink)

Volume 19, Issue 11, November 2019, Page 1-8.

In this work it is proposed that the conditions of identity for biological organisms are given by the following principle: for all organisms x and y, x = y if and only if x has been caused by the self-preserving activity of y. This principle determines both the inter-temporal identity of organisms and the identity of organism in different possible worlds. It unifies what can be supposed about conditions of identity coming from —at least— three different conceptions about the nature (...) of biological organisms, those of RobertWilson, Thomas Pradeu and Ellen Clarke. These conceptions are presented and compared. (shrink)

This book is the first systematic account of Pierre Charron's influence among the major French philosophers in the period (1601-1662). It shows that Charron's Wisdom was one of the main sources of inspiration of Pierre Gassendi's first published book, the Exercitationes adversus aristoteleos. It sheds new light on La Mothe Le Vayer, who is usually viewed as a major free thinker. By showing that he was a follower of Charron, La Mothe emerges neither as a skeptical apologist nor as a (...) disguised libertine, as combatting superstition but not as irreligious. The book shows the close presence of Charron in the preambles of Descartes' philosophy and that the cogito is mainly based on the moral Academic self-assurance of Charron's wise man. This interpretation reverses the standard view of Descartes' relation to skepticism. Once this skepticism is recognized to be Charron's Academic one, it is seen not as the target but as the source of the cogito. Pascal is the last major philosopher for whom Charron's wisdom is crucially relevant. Montaigne and Descartes influenced, respectively, Pascal's view of the Pyrrhonian skeptic and of the skeptical main arguments. The book shows that Charron's Academic skeptical wise man is one of the main targets of his projected apology for Christianity, since he considered him as a threat and counter-example of the kind of Christian view of human beings he believed. By restoring the historical philosophical relevance of Charron in early modern philosophy and arguing for the relevance of Academic skepticism in the period, this book opens a new research program to early modern scholars and will be valuable for those interested in the history of philosophy, French literature and religion. (shrink)

This paper has two sections. In the first one I examine Pascal's appropriation in La 131 of the Cartesian argument of the deceiver God. Pascal develops a skeptical reading of the argument in order to use it as a premise for his apologetic argument of true religion. In the second section I examine Huet's appropriation of this same Cartesian argument in his Philosophical Treatise on the Weakness of Human Understanding. Based on this work of Huet's and on his margin notes (...) on Pascal's Thoughts, I show that his skeptical reading of the argument is derived from Pascal's, although Huet's and Pascal's goals are distinct: while the latter intends to provide an argument for the Fall of Man, the former intends to show the weakness of reason unassisted by supernatural faith. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Academic Skepticism in Early Modern PhilosophyJosé R. Maia NetoAncient skepticism was more influential in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries than it had ever been before. Thanks to the groundwork of Charles B. Schmitt and Richard H. Popkin on the influence of ancient skepticism in early modern philosophy and to the extensive research that followed their lead, skepticism is now recognized as having played a major role in the rise (...) of modern thought. 1There were two ancient skeptical schools, Academic skepticism and Pyrrhon-ism. Were both equally influential? Until the sixteenth century, Pyrrhonism was scarcely known. Only a few copies of Sextus’s books (the only surviving primary source of ancient Pyrrhonism) have been discovered in medieval libraries. By contrast the main source of Academic skepticism, Cicero’s Aca-demica, was occasionally referred to by medieval authors and was the object of some commentaries and criticism in the Renaissance. 2 Academic skepticism was preserved from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance not only through Cicero’s Academica, but also through Lactantius’s Divinae Institutiones and [End Page 199] Augustine’s Contra Academicos. 3 This situation changed when Sextus’s works were translated to latin and published in 1562 and 1569. Sextus presents a much more complete and detailed account and defense of ancient skepticism than that of Cicero’s Academica. Sextus presents Pyrrhonism as a coherent form of skepticism and Academic skepticism as a kind of negative dogmatism. 4 It was thus natural that the ancient skepticism that fascinated some (and troubled so many) early modern thinkers was mostly Pyrrhonian. Because of the publication of Sextus’s works, according to Schmitt, the increasing influence of Cicero’s Academica in the Renaissance was halted. Sextus’s Hypotyposes and Adversus Mathematicos took the place of Cicero’s Academica and drastically increased the influence of ancient skepticism. 5 The skeptical crisis at the dawn of modern philosophy is called “pyrrhonienne” not “academicienne.”While the appearance of Sextus’s works in Latin turned him and Pyrrhonism into the main source and influence of ancient skepticism in early modern philosophy, further research on the history of skepticism in the period has shown that the role of Cicero’s Academica and of Academic skepticism in general continued to be considerable. First, Cicero’s works were important items in the university curricula. Although Cicero’s works of rhetoric and morals were those more read, the students could certainly learn about Academic skepticism through at least some of them. Second, many editions of De Natura Deorum, a work of Cicero’s in which Academic skepticism is quite central, were published during the seventeenth century. Third, features of Academic skepticism, exhibited above all in Cicero’s Academica, are basic to the skepticism revived in the late Renaissance by Montaigne and Charron; were related to the new science in the first half of the seventeenth century by Gassendi; were used in the anti-Cartesian reaction of the late seventeenth century by Rapin, Huet, Bayle, and above all Foucher; and were radicalized in the eighteenth century by Hume. Despite the Academic features of Montaigne’s, Charron’s, and Gassendi’s skepticisms, it does seem that from the publication of Sextus’s works to the mid-seventeenth century, Academic skepticism was secondary to Pyrrhonism. But the appearance of Descartes and the development of Cartesianism in the second half of the seventeenth century set conditions for a complete revamping of Academic skepticism, bringing about what Schmitt thought was precluded by the appearance of Sextus in the modern scene, namely, a “full flowering of the Academica as a work to inspire new directions of philosophical thought.” 6 [End Page 200]Montaigne’s Apologie pour Raimond Sebond is rightly considered the first major result of the revival of ancient Pyrrhonism in modern thought. 7 Montaigne never cites the name of Sextus nor acknowledges his source and, by contrast, fills his Apology with passages from Cicero on the Academic skeptics. It is clear, however, that Montaigne follows closely Sextus’s Outlines of Pyrrhonism in the central part of the Apology where he gives a detailed and sympathetic exposition of ancient skepticism.After dwelling on the evils and problems arising from knowledge and science, Montaigne... (shrink)

I present two criticisms: (1) Merge is a model of performance in speech perception experiments but not an ecologically valid model integrating both word recognition and speech perception, and (2) Merge's implementation of the variability of lexical effects must be made more precise or the model is indistinguishable from its alternatives.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume and Pascal: Pyrrhonism vs. Nature José R. Maia Neto The view that Pyrrhonism is not practically viable was, according to Richard H. Popkin, held during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuriesbydifferent philosophers suchas Mersenne,Arnauld, Pascal, Ramsay, and others.1 Among the anti-sceptics, this position was usually taken as an argument against Pyrrhonism. Popkin points out that Hume's main contribution to the "Pyrrhonian controversy" is to show that (i) "the (...) Pyrrhonian doctrine was the logical outcome of philosophical analysis,"2 (ii) that the infeasibility of Pyrrhonism does not weaken its epistemological force but only its psychological plausibility, and (Ui) that this implausibility obtains because nature (the common affairs ofeveryday life and the feeUngs, impressions, and ideas thereby generated) impels the philosopher to believe.3 Popkin alsomakes an allusion to the similaritybetweenHume and Pascal on this issue.4 In this paper I compare the dilemma posed by Pascal as apropaedeutic tofaith withthe "dangerous dilemma" alluded to, but avoided, by Hume in the conclusion of book 1 of the Treatise. The dilemma follows from (i) above. At a certain point in his epistemological enquiry the philosopher is forced tomake a hard choice between the quite disadvantageous alternatives: either to continue his philosophizing, which, leading to Pyrrhonism, may bring despair and cause the annihilation ofhis life, or to abandon philosophy, makinghim aprey ofthe "errors, absurdities, andobscurities"ofanon-critical life.5 In what follows I compare Hume's solution to this dilemma with Pascal's.? In the following passage Hume shows the toughness of the dilemma and offers a first answer to it: What party, then, shall we choose among these difficulties? If we... condemn all refin'd reasoning, we run into the most manifest absurdities. If we reject it in favour of these reasonings, we subvert entirely the human understanding. We have, therefore, no choice left but betwixt a false reason and none at all. For my part, I know not what ought to be done Volume XVII Number 1 41 JOSE R.???? NETO in the present case. I can only observe what is commonly done; which is, that this difficulty is seldom or never thought of; and even where it has once been present to the mind, is quickly forgot, and leaves but a small impression behind it. (T 268) Note that in this first answer Hume manages to avoid the normative response that the dilemma demands. He provides, instead, a descriptive account which is a kind of solution because it purports to show that human psychology makes it unlikely that someone could reach the point at which he or she would have to choose between the two parties. The dilemma does not arise because nature stops the self-subversion ofreason. Most fortunately it happens, that since reason is incapable of dispelling these clouds, nature herselfsuffices to that purpose, and cures me of this philosophical melancholy and delirium, either by relaxing this bent ofmind, or by some avocation, and lively impression of my senses, which obliterate all these chimeras. (T 269) Hume means by nature in this passage both human nature and the social and natural environments which, in so far as they demand specific reactions, generate appropriate beliefs. Those beliefs imposed by nature are necessaryforour survival. So, the mere interaction ofthe philosopher with the world outside his closet suffices to dispel his sceptical crisis. According to Hume, this determination of nature is absolute and necessary. "I find myself absolutely and necessarily determin'd to live... I may, nay I must yield to the current ofnature" (T 269). This view is reaffirmed in the Enquiry. Nature is always too strong for principle. And though a PYRRHONIAN may throw himself or others into a momentary amazement and confusion by his profound reasonings; the first and most trivial event in life will put to flight all his doubts and scruples, and leave him the same, in every point ofaction and speculation, with the philosophers of every other sect, or with those who never concerned themselves in any philosophical researches.6 So, it would appear that the dilemma is just a fleeting impression in the imagination of the philosopher during a momentary sceptical crisis. Nature provides that such a crisis is not prolonged... (shrink)

This article examines the conception of scepticism during the early modern period. It describes how the writings of Pierre Charron and Michel de Montaigne inspired authors to search for a balance between extreme scepticism and what was often described as the dogmatism of the Schools. It discusses the revival of scepticism in the Renaissance and early seventeenth-century philosophy and shows the impact of Cartesian doubt in late seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century scepticism.

A reconstrução racional do programa de pesquisa do racionalismo clássico sob a perspectiva da abordagem de solução de problemas.

Social accounting focuses on value transactions between organizations and their stakeholders; both market ones, where the value perceived by the different stakeholders is identified, and non-markets ones, where transactions are monetized at their fair value. There was long awareness of an emotional value translation, linked to the transfer of different products, services, remunerations, and incentives, regardless of whether they were market or non-market. Yet that emotional value seemed to be anchored in the field of psychology and managed to elude economic (...) science. This study seeks to identify emotional value with consumer surplus and, by extension, of the other stakeholders in a value transfer process. This proposal allows the emotional value to be anchored in the micro-economy and allows it to be objectively calculated using a regression involving three elements: the market price, the fair value interval, and a perceived satisfaction score by the different stakeholders in the form of significant sampling. The result obtained not only allows Social Accounting to be complemented with emotional value, but it also facilitates its incorporation in the strategy to optimize the emotional value. Furthermore, it enables a quantification of the perceived subjective utility, which opens up a research path where some possible lines are clearly identified. (shrink)

Este artículo analiza la crisis de la República romana tardía, atribuida por los antiguos autores a la decadencia moral y a los vicios orientales y cómo Cicerón, defensor de las instituciones republicanas y de los boni, se enfrentó a los populares que buscaban reformas estructurales. Se destacan sus conflictos con Catilina, Clodio, Pisón y, especialmente, con Antonio. A lo largo de su carrera, Cicerón defendió su dignitas y argumentó que las virtudes cardinales propuestas por Platón y Panecio eran clave para (...) alcanzar la verdadera gloria. En las Filípicas, atacó a Antonio y apoyó a Octaviano, aunque este último terminó traicionándolo. Estos discursos polarizaron la política romana, mostrando, según Bruto, la falta de visión política de Cicerón. Para defenderse de los ataques por su condena a los catilinarios y promover reformas estatales, Cicerón recurrió a la filosofía y defendió los principios platónicos y estoicos, abogando por la creencia en una providencia divina, la importancia de las virtudes cardinales, el uso de la razón y la superioridad del derecho natural de inspiración divina sobre la ley humana. También criticó a los epicúreos por su rechazo a la política, negación de la providencia divina y búsqueda del placer. (shrink)

En las Filípicas, Cicerón utilizó una amplia variedad de invectivas para denigrar a Antonio, retratándolo como un individuo antisocial que encarnaba todas las taras morales y vicios. Lo describió como un enemigo del Estado y un tirano que aspiraba a la autocracia y buscaba eliminar a los boni, defensores de la República. Estos insultos se analizan a lo largo del artículo y se observa en ellos una inversión de las virtudes cardinales descritas por Cicerón. Según Cicerón, estas virtudes eran las (...) cualidades que un estadista debía poseer, tal y como se detalla en su obra De Officiis, que escribió al mismo tiempo que pronunciaba las Filípicas. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Cartographic Memory: Social Movement Activism and the Production of Space by Juan HerreraAída R. GuhlincozziCartographic Memory: Social Movement Activism and the Production of Spaceby juan herrera Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2022Juan Herrera’s historical recounting of Latino activism in Fruitvale, California, in Cartographic Memory: Social Movement Activism and the Production of Space is stellar. In fact, the case focused on by Herrera as an example of activism producing (...) space and creating change in the name of social justice is not the only top-quality contribution to Latinx geographies to be found in this book. Herrera’s conceptualization of “cartographic memory” builds on the intertwining of Latinx writers and historians with traditional spatial thought from the history of geography. His definition of “cartographic memory” as a “political remaking of urban geography and therefore a selective mapping” adds to the broader oeuvre of activism and space coming out in recent years (14).The geographic location for Cartographic Memory comes from the author’s long history of working in and around Fruitvale as both a volunteer and community member. As a new resident of the Oakland area, Herrera mistakenly navigated himself to Fruitvale, where he found the elements of the place clearly speaking to a cultural aesthetic of Latin-idad. Intrigued, Herrera began volunteering in the area, and learned more of the long activist history of the space. That activist history, Herrera argues, has long been under-studied, or even forgotten, in Chicano activist history, and merits recognition. Herrera’s efforts with [End Page 139] this book go a long way to gathering together that spatial history and reconstructing it for the reader through interviews and oral histories with numerous activists, extensive archival research, and ethnography focusing on the 1960s and 1970s Mexican-American activist mobilization in support of the Chicano movement.The power of the focus on Fruitvale must be recognized, as Herrera also makes space for intently peeling apart the layers of nonprofit funding, social movements, and community-building and support. The chapter, “Revolution Interrupted,” is about the funding situation of the Unity Council in Fruitvale and how the funding structure was constructed over time in the context of the political and economic opportunities of the 1960s. It speaks to how this had a profound effect on the organizers and community given the shift from grassroots to institutional funding. This chapter opens the book with a focus on the national scope of funding opportunities for organizations in the 1960s that focused on race and ethnicity. Through this lens are explored the effects of local political actions—such as the 1969 speech by San Antonio-based Mexican American Youth Organization (MAYO) leader Jose Angel Gutierrez—on funding at the federal level. Because of the perceived militancy of these remarks, the U.S. Congress became concerned, and eventually passed the 1969 Tax Reform bill, limiting the types of projects that could be funded philanthropically. This type of multi-scale understanding of Fruitvale activism is threaded throughout the entire book, from chapter 1, “Making Place,” in which Herrera summarizes activist perspectives on Fruitvale as emphasizing “not only how the neighborhood itself [produced] a geography of activism but also how it was interconnected to other places of struggle throughout the United States” (emphasis in original; 33).Herrera also navigates the interactions of race, ethnicity, and space, tracing how coalitions, influences on political efforts, and collaboration took place throughout Fruitvale and Oakland during this period. His second chapter, “The Other Minority,” identifies where Black Panther Party-related work occurred; the marketization that began to occur of a non-threatening, non-Black “Latino” identity; the effect that this had on activist efforts; and more. Importantly, in this chapter Herrera’s interviews reveal that part of the interest in these coalitions came from the clear organizational success Black activists had achieved in their [End Page 140] work, leading Mexican American activists in Oakland to pursue similar efforts. One interviewee, Herman Gallegos, a prominent activist at the time, spoke of recalling an event where Black men would gather monthly to focus on leadership. Thinking highly of them, he says that he recognized them as future “mayors, judges... [but] kept thinking... (shrink)